We prove the equivalence of two de nitions of non-malleable encryption appearing in the literature| the original one of Dolev, Dwork and Naor and the later one of Bellare, Desai, Pointcheval and Rogaway. The equivalence relies on a new characterization of non-malleable encryption in terms of the standard notion of indistinguishability of Goldwasser and Micali. We show that non-malleability is equivalent to indistinguishability under a parallel chosen ciphertext attack," this being a new kind of chosen ciphertext attack we introduce, in which the adversary's decryption queries are not allowed to depend on answers to previous queries, but must be made all at once. This characterization simpli es both the notion of non-malleable encryption and its usage, and enables one to see more easily how it compares with other notions of encryption. The results here apply to non-malleable encryption under any form of attack, whether chosen-plaintext, chosen-ciphertext, or adaptive c hosen-ciphertext.
Introduction
Public-key encryption has several goals in terms of protecting the data that is encrypted. The most basic is privacy, where the goal is to ensure that an attacker does not learn any useful information about the data from the ciphertext. Goldwasser and Micali's notion of indistinguishability 8 forms the accepted formalization of this goal. A second goal, introduced by Dolev, Dwork and Naor 5 , is non-malleability, which, roughly, requires that an attacker give n a c hallenge ciphertext be unable to modify it into another, di erent ciphertext in such a w a y that the plaintexts underlying the two ciphertexts are meaningfully related" to each other. Both these goals can beconsidered under attacks of increasing severity: chosen-plaintext attacks, and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attacks 11, 12 . Recent uses of public-key encryption have seen a growing need for, and hence attention to, stronger than basic forms of security, like non-malleability. This kind of security is important when encryption is used as a primitive in the design of higher level protocols, for example for key distribution cf. 1 or electronic payment cf. 13 . The interest is witnessed by attention to classi cation of the notions of encryption 2 and new e cient constructions of non-malleable schemes 3, 4 .
In our discussions below, we begin for simplicity b y focusing on the case where the notions are considered under chosen-plaintext attacks. We will discuss the extensions to stronger attacks later.
Themes in foundations of encryption
Equivalences. We said above that indistinguishability w as the accepted" formalization of the privacy goal. This agreement is due in large part to a body of work that has established that numerous other formalizations put forth to capture privacy are actually equivalent to indistinguishability. In particular this is true of semantic security 8 and for a notion of privacy based on computational entropy 14, 10 . These foundational results have since been re ned and extended to other settings 7 . These equivalences are a cornerstone of our understating of privacy, providing evidence that we h a v e in fact found the right" formalization. Characterizations. Semantic security captures in perhaps the most direct way one's intuition of a good notion of privacy. Roughly, i t s a ys that whatever can be e ciently computed about a message given the ciphertext can be computed without the ciphertext". But it is a relatively complex and subtle notion to formalize. For this reason, it is somewhat di cult to use in applications of encryption. Indistinguishability has the opposite attributes. The formalization is simple, appealing and easy to use. It says that if we take t w o equal-length messages m 0 ; m 1 , an adversary given an encryption of a random one of them cannot tell which i t w as with a probability signi cantly better than that of guessing. It is by far the rst choice when analyzing the security of an encryption based application. But it is less clear by just a direct examination of the de nition that it really captures an intuitively strong notion of privacy. However, we know it does, because it is in fact equivalent to semantic security. Accordingly, we can view indistinguishability a s a characterization" of semantic security, a simple, easy to use notion backed by the fact of being equivalent to the more naturally intuitive one.
Thus, beyond equivalences between notions, one also seeks a characterization that is simple and easy to work with, a role which for privacy is played by the notion of indistinguishability.
Questions for non-malleability
The foundations of non-malleable encryption are currently not as well laid as those of privacy, for several reasons.
First, there are in the literature two di erent formalizations to capture the notion of nonmalleable encryption. The rst is the original de nition of Dolev, Dwork and Naor 5 , which we call SNM simulation based non-malleability. A second, somewhat simpler formalization was introduced by Bellare, Desai, Pointcheval and Rogaway 2 , and we call it CNM comparison based non-malleability. A priori, at least, the two seem to have important di erences.
Second, there is no simple characterization of non-malleable encryption akin to indistinguishability for privacy. Rather, the current formalizations of non-malleability follow the de nitional paradigm of semantic security and in particular both existing formulations are quite complex even though that of 2 is somewhat simpler than that of 5 , and subtle at the level of details. A consequence is that non-malleability can be hard to use. The applicability o f non-malleability w ould be increased by h a ving some simple characterization of the notion.
Although not required for the statement of our results, it may beinstructive t o try to convey some rough idea of the existing formalizations. Formal de nitions of both notions can befound in Section 3. The de nitions involve considering some relation R between plaintexts, having an adversary output a distribution on some set of messages, and then setting up a challenge-response game. The adversary is given as input a ciphertext y of a plaintext x drawn from the message distribution, and must produce a vector of ciphertexts y. If x is the plaintext vector corresponding to y, security requires, roughly, that the adversary's ability to make Rx; x true in this game is not much more than her ability to make it true had she had to produce y without being given y at all, namely given no information about x other than its distribution. The two known de nitions di er in how exactly they measure the success in the last part of the game. The SNM notion is based on the simulation paradigm: a s c heme is secure if for any adversary there exists a simulator which does almost as well without any information about the challenge ciphertext given to the adversary. In the CNM formalization, there is no simulator: it is required instead that the success probability of the adversary under the real" challenge and a fake" challenge be about the same. Besides the fundamental di erence of one being simulation based and the other not, the SNM notion does not allow the simulator access to the decryption oracle even when the adversary gets it, while the CNM notion allows the adversary access to the decryption oracle in both games. These di erences would raise a priori doubts about whether the two notions could be equivalent. In particular, SNM would appear to be stronger since it asks for simulation even without access to decryption ability.
The equivalence
In this paper we show that the above t w o notions of non-malleability are in fact equivalent. This holds under all three kinds of attack mentioned above. In other words, if a particular encryption scheme meets the SNM notion of security, then it also meets the CNM notion, and vice versa.
Thus, we are saying that two formalizations of non-malleability, that were originally proposed with somewhat di erent i n tuitions behind them, are in fact capturing the same underlying notion. Like the equivalences amongst notions of privacy, this result serves to strengthen our conviction that this single, uni ed notion of non-malleability is in fact the appropriate one.
An indistinguishability based characterization
Perhaps more interesting than the above-mentioned equivalence is a result used to prove it. This is a new characterization of non-malleability that we feel simpli es the notion and increases our understanding of it and its relation to the more classic notions. Roughly speaking, we show that non-malleability is actually just a form of indistinguishability, but under a certain special type of chosen-ciphertext attack that we i n troduce and call a parallel chosen-ciphertext attack. Thus, what appears to be a di erent adversarial goal namely, the ability to modify a ciphertext in such a w a y as to create relations between the underlying plaintexts corresponds actually to the standard goal of privacy, as long as we add power to the attack model. This represents a tradeo between goals and attacks.
Our characterization dispenses with the relation R and the message space: it is just about a game involving two messages.
To illustrate, consider non-malleability under chosen-plaintext attack. Our characterization says this is equivalent to indistinguishability under a chosen-ciphertext attack in which the adversary gets to ask a single vector query of the decryption oracle. This means it speci es a sequence c 1 ; : : : ; c n of ciphertexts, and obtains the corresponding plaintexts p 1 ; : : : ; p n from the oracle. But the choice of c 2 is not allowed to depend on the answer to c 1 , and so on. So we can think of all the queries as made in parallel, hence the name. Perhaps a better name would have been non-adaptive queries, but the term non-adaptive is already in use in another way in this area and was best avoided. This query is allowed to be a function of the challenge ciphertext. We call this type of attack a parallel chosen-ciphertext attack". In more detail the game is that we take two equal-length messages m 0 ; m 1 , give the adversary a ciphertext y of a random one of them, and now allow it a single parallel vector decryption oracle query, the only constraint on which is that the query not contain y in any component. The adversary wins if it can then say which of the two messages m 0 ; m 1 had been encrypted to produce the challenge y, with a probability signi cantly better than that of guessing. Thus, as mentioned above, our notion makes no mention of a relation R or a probability space on messages, let alone of a simulator. Instead, it follows an entirely standard paradigm, the only twist being the nature of the attack model.
A special case that might beworth noting is that when the relation R is binary, the parallel attack need contain just one ciphertext. In general, the numberof parallel queries needed is one less than the arity o f R .
Recall that non-malleability at rst glance is capturing a very di erent sort of notion than indistinguishability: the ability to modify a ciphertext in some way so as to create plaintext dependencies. This can be done even if one doesn't know" the plaintexts involved, so it seems di erent from privacy. Our characterization brings out the fact that the di erence is not so great: the increased severity of the goal of non-malleability can be compensated for by a strong attack under indistinguishability.
Extensions and discussion
We have focused above mostly on non-malleability under chosen-plaintext attack. Let us brie y discuss the extensions of the results to the two kinds of chosen-ciphertext attack. They are referred to in 2 as CCA1 and CCA2, and correspond to lunch-time 11 and adaptive 12 attacks.
As mentioned above, our equivalence result extends to the stronger attack forms. However, for the case of the strongest type of attack, namely CCA2, the result is not really a novelty, because it can be derived as a consequence of the results of 2 and 6 . Speci cally each of these showed that their notion of non-malleability under CCA2 is equivalent t o indistinguishability under CCA2, so this makes the two notions of non-malleability under CCA2 equivalent to each other. Thus the interest of our results is largely for the case of chosen-plaintext attack and CCA1.
A similar situation holds with regard to the characterization. It is simple to provide an appropriate extension of indistinguishability under parallel attack to the CCA1 and CCA2 settings, and we can show the characterization holds. But adding a parallel attack to CCA2 leaves the latter unchanged, and our results just collapses to the already know equivalence between non-malleability and indistinguishability in the CCA2 case.
Relations among notions of security
Our new characterization of non-malleability as indistinguishability under a parallel chosen-ciphertext attack simpli es the discussion of relationships among the notions of security studied in 2, 6 . Our characterization shows that non-malleability with respect to chosen-plaintext attack, lunchtime chosen-ciphertext attack, or adaptive c hosen-ciphertext attack is equivalent to indistinguishability with respect to a parallel chosen-ciphertext attack denoted PA0, a lunchtime attack followed by a parallel attack denoted PA1, or an adaptive c hosen ciphertext attack denote CCA2, respectively. Thus, by our equivalence, the six standard notions of security are equivalent to indistinguishability with respect to ve di erent t ypes of attack, denoted CPA; PA0; CCA1; PA1; and CCA2. Now, to show that these notions are all distinct, it su ces to show for each pair of notions that an encryption scheme secure against the weaker form of attack can be modi ed to fail against the stronger attack, but still be secure against the weaker form of attack. Using our new characterization one can in fact separate all these notions by simply following the following guidelines: To make a system insecure under a lunchtime attack, one simply needs to x a particular ciphertext which decrypts to the secret key. In order to require that a non-parallel attack beused to do this, one may add a level of indirection by h a ving a particular ciphertext that decrypts to another randomly chosen ciphertext, whose decryption is the secret key. To modify a system that is secure against lunchtime attacks in order to make it fail against an adaptive parallel attack, one simply establishes a rule that a ciphertext can bemodi ed in a canonical manner to produce a new ciphertext that decrypts to the same value. Again, to require that a non-parallel attack beused, one may again add a level of indirection, by h a ving the modi ed ciphertext decrypt to another ciphertext, which decrypts to the original message. These intuitions, which are very natural given the attacks, can readily be made into proofs which are simpler than those given by 2 to accomplish this goal.
Note also that each of 2 and 6 established relations using their own de nitions of nonmalleability. Their results are uni ed by our results showing the two notions of non-malleability are the same.
Above, we only consider parallel chosen-ciphertext attacks in the adaptive stage of the attack, i.e. when the adversary has seen the challenge ciphertext. However, it is quite natural to consider a parallel attack as also possible in the rst stage of the attack, before the challenge ciphertext is known. This leads naturally to nine di erent notions of security against chosen-ciphertext attacks. It could be interesting to investigate these attacks and any relations which m a y exist among them.
Related work
Halevi and Krawczyk introduce a weak version of chosen-ciphertext attack which they call a oneciphertext veri cation attack 9 . This is not the same as a parallel attack. In their attack, the adversary generates a single plaintext along with a candidate ciphertext, and is allowed to ask a veri cation query, namely whether or not the pair is valid. In our notion, the adversary has more power: it can access the decryption oracle. No equivalences are proved in 9 .
Preliminaries
Experiments. We use standard notations and conventions for writing probabilistic algorithms and experiments. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then Ax 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; r is the result of running A on inputs x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : and coins r. We let y Ax 1 ; x 2 ; : : : denote the experiment of picking r at random and letting y be Ax 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; r . If S is a nite set then x S is the operation of picking an element uniformly from S. If is neither an algorithm nor a set then x is a simple assignment statement. We s a y that y can be output by Ax 1 ; x 2 ; : : : if there is some r such that Ax 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; r = y . Also, to clarify complicated probabilistic statements, we de ne random variables as experiments. Syntax and conventions. The syntax of an encryption scheme speci es what kinds of algorithms make it up. Formally, an asymmetric encryption scheme is given by a triple of algorithms, = K; E; D, where K, the key generation algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter k 2 N provided in unary and returns a pair pk; sk of matching public and secret keys. E, the encryption algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a public key pk and a message x 2 f 0 ; 1 g to produce a ciphertext y. D, the decryption algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm which takes a secret key sk and ciphertext y to produce either a message x 2 f 0 ; 1 g or a special symbol?to indicate that the ciphertext was invalid.
We require that for all pk; sk which can beoutput by K1 k , for all x 2 f0; 1g , and for all y that can be output by E pk x, we have that D sk y = x . W e also require that K, E and D can be computed in polynomial time. As the notation indicates, the keys are indicated as subscripts to the algorithms.
Recall that a function : N ! R is negligible if for every constant c 0 there exists an integer k c such that k k ,c for all k k c .
Notation. We will need to discuss vectors of plaintexts or ciphertexts. A vector is denoted in boldface, as in x. We denote by jxj the number of components in x, and by x i the i-th component, so that x = x 1 ; : : : ; x j x j . We extend the set membership notation to vectors, writing x 2 x or x 6 2 x to mean, respectively, that x is in or is not in the set f x i : 1 i j x j g . It will be convenient to extend the decryption notation to vectors with the understanding that operations are performed component-wise. Thus x D sk y is shorthand for the following: for 1 i j y j do x i D sk y i .
We will consider relations of arity t where t will bepolynomial in the security parameter k.
Rather than writing Rx 1 ; : : : ; x t w e write Rx; x, meaning the rst argument is special and the rest are bunched int o a v ector x with jxj = t , 1.
Two de nitions of non-malleable encryption
In the setting of non-malleable encryption, the goal of an adversary, given a ciphertext y, is not as with indistinguishability to learn something about its plaintext x, but rather to output a vector y of ciphertexts whose decryption x is meaningfully related" to x, meaning that Rx; x holds for some relation R. The question is how exactly one measures the advantage of the adversary. This turns out to need care. One possible formalization is that of 5, 6 , which i s based on the idea of simulation; it asks that for every adversary there exists a certain type of simulator" that does just as well as the adversary but without being given y. In another, somewhat simpler formalization introduced in 2 , there is no simulator; security is de ned via an experiment i n v olving the adversary alone. We begin below b y presenting these two notions.
De nition of SNM
In this subsection we describe the de nition of non-malleable encryption of 5, 6 , which w e call SNM for simulation based non-malleability." The SNM formulation xes a polynomial time computable relation R, which is viewed as taking four arguments, Rx; x; M ; s 1 , with x being a vector with an arbitrary number of components.
The adversary A = A 1 ; A 2 runs in two stages. The rst stage of the adversary, namely A 1 , computes the encoding of a distribution M on messages and also some state information: a string s 1 to pass to the relation R, and a string s 2 to pass on to A 2 . At A 1 's discretion, either of these might include M and pk. We call M the message space. It must bevalid, which means that all strings having non-zero probability under M are of the same length.
The second stage of the adversary, namely A 2 , receives s 2 and the encryption y of a random message x drawn from M. Algorithm A 2 then outputs a vector of ciphertexts y. We s a y that A is successful if Rx; x; M ; s 1 holds, and also y 6 2 y and ? 6 2 x , where x = D sk y.
The requirement for security is that for any polynomial time adversary A and any polynomial time relation R there exists a polynomial time algorithm S = S 1 ; S 2 , the simulator, that, without being given y, has about the same success probability a s A . The experiment here is that S 1 is rst run on pk to produce M;s 1 ; s 2 , then x is selected from M, then S 2 is run on s 2 but no encryption of x to produce y. Success means x = D sk y satis es Rx; x; M ; s 1 and ? 6 2 x . F or CCA2 both A 1 and A 2 get the decryption oracle, but A 2 is not allowed to call it on the challenge ciphertext y; for CCA1 just A 1 gets the decryption oracle; and for CPA neither A 1 nor A 2 get it. However, a key feature of the SNM de nition is that no matter what the attack, the simulator does not get a decryption oracle, even though the adversary may get one.
We n o w provide a formal de nition for simulation-based non-malleability. When we s a y O i = " , where i 2 f 1 ; 2 g , w e mean O i is the function which, on any input, returns the empty string, ". De nition 3.1 SNM-CPA, SNM-CCA1, SNM-CCA2 Let = K; E; D be an encryption scheme, let R bearelation, let A = A 1 ; A 2 bean adversary, and let S = S 1 ; S 2 bean algorithm the simulator". For atk 2 f cpa; cca1; cca2g and k 2 N de ne Adv snm-atk A;S; R;k def = Pr Expt snm-atk A; R;k = 1 , Pr Expt snm-atk S; R;k = 1 ; We s a y that is secure in the sense of SNM-ATK if for every polynomial pk, every R computable in time pk, every A that runs in time pk and outputs a valid message space M sampleable in time pk, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm S = S 1 ; S 2 such that Adv snm-atk A;S; R;k is negligible. It is understood above that in the case of CCA2, A 2 is not allowed to ask its oracle for the decryption of the challenge ciphertext y.
The condition that y 6 2 y is made in order to not give the adversary credit for the trivial and unavoidable action of copying the challenge ciphertext. The requirement that M is valid is important; it stems from the fact that encryption is not intended to conceal the length of the plaintext.
De nition of CNM
We n o w recall the de nition of non-malleable encryption of 2 , which w e call CNM for comparison based non-malleability." Let A = A 1 ; A 2 b e a n a d v ersary. The rst stage of the adversary, namely A 1 , is given the public key pk, and outputs a description of a valid message space, described by a sampling algorithm M. The second stage of the adversary, namely A 2 , receives an encryption y of a random message x drawn from M. The adversary then outputs a description of a relation R and a vector y. We insist that no component of y be equal to y. The adversary hopes that Rx; x holds, where x D sk y. An adversary A 1 ; A 2 is successful if it can do this with a probability signi cantly more than that with which Rx; x holds if she had been given as input not an encryption of x but rather an encryption of somex also chosen uniformly from M, independently of x.
De nition 3.2 CNM-CPA, CNM-CCA1, CNM-CCA2 Let = K; E; D be an encryption scheme and let A = A 1 ; A 2 b e a n a d v ersary. For atk 2 f cpa; cca1; cca2g and k 2 N de ne We say that is secure in the sense of CNM-ATK if for every polynomial pk: if A runs in time pk, outputs a valid message space M sampleable in time pk, and outputs a relation R computable in time pk, then Adv cnm-atk A; is negligible. It is understood above that in the case of CCA2, A 2 is not allowed to ask its oracle for the decryption of the challenge ciphertext y.
We declare the adversary unsuccessful when some ciphertext y i does not have a v alid decryption that is, ? 2 x , because in this case, the receiver is simply going to reject the adversary's message anyway.
The major di erence between SNM and CNM is that the former asks for a simulator and the latter does not, but some more minor di erences exist too. For example in SNM the relation R is xed beforehand, while in CNM it is generated dynamically by the adversary in its second stage.
New notion: IND under parallel attack
We present a new notion of security for a public key encryption scheme: indistinguishability under a parallel chosen-ciphertext attack.
Here, malleability is not evident i n a n y explicit way; there is no relation R, and the adversary does not output ciphertexts, but rather tries to predict information about the plaintext. Nonetheless we show that this notion is equivalent to both forms of non-malleability given above. In this attack, the adversary is allowed to query the decryption oracle a polynomial number of times, but the di erent queries made are not allowed to depend on each other. A simple way to visualize this is to imagine the adversary making the queries in parallel," as a vector c where c 1 ; : : : ; c n are ciphertexts, for n = jcj. The oracle replies with D sk c = D sk c 1 ; : : : ; D sk c n , the vector of the corresponding plaintexts. Only one of these parallel queries is allowed, and it is always in the second stage, meaning can be a function of the challenge ciphertext.
It is convenient to make the parallel query quite explicit in the formalization. We do this by considering the second stage A 2 of the adversary as made up of two sub-stages, A 2;q and A 2;g , the q" standing for query" and the g" for guess". The rst stage outputs the parallel query; the second is given the response, and completes the guessing work of the second stage. More precisely, view the adversary A = A 1 ; A 2 where A 2 = A 2 ;q ; A 2 ;g as a pair. Algorithm A 1 is run on input the public key, pk. At the end of A 1 's execution she outputs a triple x 0 ; x 1 ; s 1 , the rst two components being messages which we insist be of the same length, and the last being state information possibly including pk which she wants to preserve. A random one of x 0 and x 1 is now selected, say x b . A c hallenge" y is determined by encrypting x b under pk. It is the job of the pair A 2;q ; A 2 ;g to try to determine if y was selected as the encryption of x 0 or x 1 , i.e. try to guess b. To make this determination, rst run A 2;q on x 0 ; x 1 ; s 1 ; y and let it output a parallel query c and state information s 2 . The latter will include y;s 1 if necessary. Then run A 2;g on input D sk c; s 2 and get a guess g. The adversary wins if g = b.
We can add this parallel attack to any of the previous attacks CPA; CCA1; CCA2, yielding respectively the attacks PA0; PA1; PA2. Note that since in CCA2, the second stage of the adversary can already do adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, giving it the ability to perform a parallel attack yields no additional power, so in fact CCA2 = PA2. For concision and clarity we simultaneously de ne indistinguishability with respect to PA0; PA1; and PA2. The only di erence lies in whether or not A 1 and A 2 are given decryption oracles. We let the string atk be instantiated by any of the formal symbols pa0; pa1; pa2, while ATK is then the corresponding formal symbol from PA0; PA1; PA2. is negligible. We insist, above, that A 1 outputs x 0 ; x 1 with jx 0 j = jx 1 j. In the case of PA2, we further insist that A 2 does not ask its oracle to decrypt y.
Results
Here we establish the equivalence of all three notions discussed. This is established by the following sequence of propositions. We n o w turn to the proofs. in terms of the canonical simulator, the di culty is that this simulator" would, in running A, n o w need access to a decryption oracle, which i s not allowed under SNM. Thus, it might appear that CNM-CPA is actually weaker, corresponding to the ability to simulate by simulators which are also given the decryption oracle. However, this appearance is false. In fact, CNM-CPA is not weaker; rather, CNM-ATK implies SNM-ATK for all three types of attacks ATK, including CCA1 and CCA2. In other words, if a scheme meets the CNM-CPA de nition, it is possible to design a simulator according to the SNM de nition.
CNM implies SNM
Proof of Proposition 5.1: Let = K; E; D be the given encryption scheme. Let R and A = A 1 ; A 2 be given. To show the scheme is secure in the sense of SNM-ATK we need to construct a simulator S = S 1 ; S 2 . The idea is that S will run A on a newly chosen public key of which it knows the corresponding decryption key: Thus, glancing at the de nition of B, w e see that this experiment is precisely the same as g Expt cnm-atk B; k with pk and sk replaced by the pk 0 and sk 0 chosen by the simulator. Hence, Adv snm-atk A;S; R;k = Adv cnm-atk B; k. But the latter is negligible since is secure in the sense of CNM-ATK, so the former is negligible too.
SNM-ATK IND-PXX
Proof of Proposition 5.2: We already know that SNM-CCA2 and IND-CCA2 are equivalent 6 .
But IND-PA2 and IND-CCA2 are obviously identical since in both cases, a chosen-ciphertext attack is allowed in the second stage, and this subsumes a parallel attack. Thus we need prove the proposition only for the cases of AT K = C P A and ATK = CCA1. We are assuming that encryption scheme is secure in the SNM-ATK sense. We will show it is also secure in the IND-PXX sense. Let B = B 1 ; B 2 bean IND-PXX adversary attacking .
We want to show that Adv ind-pxx B; is negligible. To this end, we describe a relation R and an SNM-ATK adversary A = A 1 ; A 2 attacking using R. We wish to show that A will have the same advantage attacking using R as B has as an IND-PXX adversary using a parallel attack. What allows us to do this is to pick the relation R to capture the success condition of B's parallel attack. Adversaries A and B have access to an oracle O 1 in their rst stage but we can assume that oracle in their second stage O 2 = ", with this oracle being instantiated according to the attack ATK as per the de nitions.
To get some intuition it is best to think of ATK = CPA, meaning A is allowed only a chosenplaintext attack. However, B has limited access to a decryption oracle; it is allowed the parallel query. How then can A simulate" B? The key observation is that the non-malleability goal involves an implicit" ciphertext attack on the part of the adversary, e v en under CPA. This arises from the ciphertext vector y that such an adversary outputs. It gets decrypted, and the results are fed into the relation R. Thus, the idea of our proof is to make A output, as its nal response, the parallel query that B will make. Now, B would expect to get back the response and compute with it, which A can't do; once it has output its nal ciphertext, it stops, and the relation R gets evaluated on the corresponding plaintext. So we de ne R in such a way that it completes" B's computation. A useful way to think about this is as if A were trying to communicate" with R, passing it the information that R needs to execute B. Notice that for this to work it is crucial that B's query is a parallel one. If B were making the usual adaptive queries, A could not output a single ciphertext vector, because it would have to know the decryption of the rst ciphertext query before it would even know the ciphertext which is the second query. Yet, for the non-malleability game, A must output a single vector. This is the rough idea. There are a couple of subtleties. R needs to know several pieces of information that depend on the computation of some stages of B, such as coin tosses. A must communicate them to R. The only mechanism that A has to communicate with R is via the ciphertext vector y that A outputs, whose decryption is fed to R. So To conclude the proof, we need only show that the probability that any simulator S will succeed in attacking R as de ned above in the experiment Expt snm-atk S; R;k is at most 1 2 . By construction, in order to satisfy R the rst stage of S must output a distribution M that is uniform on two messages m 0 and m 1 . Suppose S does so with probability q 1. Now let p b bethe probability that S create output so as to cause B 2;g to output b. Since the behavior of S is independent of the chosen x 2 M, p 0 + p 1 1. Hence, also by independence, the probability that S will succeed in causing R to accept is bounded by qp 0 Pr x = m 0 + p 1 Pr x = m 1 qp 0 1 2 + p 1 1 2 1 2 .
Thus, we h a v e that A straightforward calculation establishes that the advantage of the IND-PXX adversary given above will be negligibly close to the advantage of the CNM-ATK adversary, completing the proof.
